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Whatmakes a successful exportingﬁrm? This question has attracted
much interest from policy makers, keen to design effective export
promotion programs, and from academics, keen to understand the
implications of globalization for economic growth. Two answers have
been proposed. The ﬁrst focuses on ﬁrm productivity. Studies by
Clerides et al. (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (1999), among others,
have found that ﬁrms self-select into export markets on the basis of
their successful performance at home. This evidence inspired the theo-
retical work by Melitz (2003) where only the most productive ﬁrmsfor granting us access to INEGI
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. This is an open access article underﬁnd it worthwhile to cover the extra costs of exporting. The second
answer focuses onproduct quality. A growing body ofwork has provided
evidence that successful exporters charge higher prices on average,
suggesting that quality matters.1
This study integrates these two views and shows both theoretically
and empirically that ﬁrmsmay choose to compete on the basis of either
cost or quality depending on the characteristics of the products they sell
and the markets in which they operate.2 Unlike other studies which
have compared the behavior of different ﬁrms, and emphasized the
between-ﬁrm extensive margin, we focus on the portfolio of products
sold by multi-product ﬁrms, and highlight what Eckel and Neary
(2010) call the “intra-ﬁrm extensive margin”. Our theoretical innova-
tion is to construct a model of multi-product ﬁrms in which the quality
of goods is determined endogenously by the ﬁrms' proﬁt-maximizing1 A large and growing literature includes Antoniades (2009), Baldwin and Harrigan
(2011), Baller (2013), Crozet et al. (2012), Demir (2012), Hallak and Schott (2011), Hallak
and Sivadasan (2013), Iacovone and Javorcik (2007), Johnson (2012), Khandelwal (2010),
Kneller and Yu (2008), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), Mandel (2009), Manova and Zhang
(2012), and Verhoogen (2008).
2 Hallak and Sivadasan (2013) also integrate the productivity and quality approaches in
a model of international trade by assuming two sources of exogenous ﬁrm heterogeneity:
productivity and “caliber”, the latter being the ability to produce quality using fewer ﬁxed
inputs. Provided exporting requires attaining minimum quality levels, their model ex-
plains the empirical fact that ﬁrm size is not monotonically related to export status, and
predicts that, conditional on size, exporters sell products of higher quality and at higher
prices. However, they conﬁne attention to single-product ﬁrms.
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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core competence have lower costs. As a result, ﬁrms produce more of
those products, but they also have higher margins on them, and there-
fore higher incentives to invest in their quality. These two effects have
opposite implications for the proﬁle of prices and, depending on
which effect dominates, the model implies one of two possible conﬁgu-
rations which we call “cost-based” and “quality-based” competence,
respectively. The former corresponds to the case where a ﬁrm's core
products are sold at lower prices, in order to induce consumers to
buymore of them. In the words of Jack Cohen, founder of the UK super-
market chain Tesco, ﬁrms “pile 'em high and sell 'em cheap”. As a result,
the proﬁle of prices across a ﬁrm's products is inversely correlated with
its proﬁle of sales. By contrast, quality-based competence corresponds
to the case where the dominant effect comes from ﬁrms' investing
more in enhancing the quality of their core products. As a result, these
products command higher prices, and so the proﬁle of prices across a
ﬁrm's products is positively correlated with its proﬁle of sales.
Our model not only allows for different proﬁles of prices but also
makes predictions about which kinds of goods should exhibit which
proﬁle. In particular, it predicts that a higher level of product differenti-
ation encourages ﬁrms to invest relatively more in the quality of
individual varieties than in the quality of their overall brand. As a result,
quality-based competence should bemore in evidence in sectors where
products are more differentiated. We test this prediction using a rich
Mexican data set already used by Iacovone and Javorcik (2007, 2010).
Most previous empirical studies of multi-product ﬁrms at plant level
have been constrained to use data on export sales only, or to combine
export and production data at different levels of disaggregation.3 By
contrast, a unique characteristic of our data is that it provides consis-
tently disaggregated information on both the home and export sales
of all goods produced by a large representative sample ofmanufacturing
establishments.4 As we show, the Mexican data provide robust conﬁr-
mation of the model's key prediction: comparing price proﬁles with
sales proﬁles, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms in differentiated-good sectors exhibit
quality-based competence to a much greater extent than ﬁrms in non-
differentiated-good sectors, both at home and abroad. The contrast is
particularly striking in export markets, where Mexican producers in
non-differentiated-good sectors engage in cost-rather than quality-
based competence. Our results are robust to focusing attention on a
variety of subsamples, including only those products sold both at
home and abroad, only those plants which sell on the home market
and also select into exporting, and only single-plant ﬁrms.
Our paper builds on and extends the existing literature on multi-
product ﬁrms in international trade. While there already existed
a large literature on multi-product ﬁrms in the theory of industrial
organization, our model is one of a number of recent trade models
which is more applicable to the kinds of large-scale ﬁrm-level data
sets which are increasingly becoming available.5 Within this latter
tradition, existing models impose one or other proﬁle of a ﬁrm's
prices by assumption. One class of models assumes that products are3 Examples of the ﬁrst approach include Arkolakis and Muendler (2010), Berthou and
Fontagné (2013), Eaton et al. (2008), and Mayer et al. (2014). Examples of the second in-
clude Bernard et al. (2011), and Goldberg et al. (2010a,b). Baldwin and Gu (2009) use
compatible data on production and exports by Canadian plants, but implement a theoret-
ical framework which imposes symmetry between a ﬁrm's products, an issue which we
discuss in more detail below.
4 While our data set is unique in providing information at the same level of disaggrega-
tion on both home and export sales, we cannot distinguish between different export des-
tinations. Fortunately, this problem is not so severe in the case of Mexico, since the U.S. is
by far the dominant market for most Mexican manufacturing exports.
5 Most models of multi-product ﬁrms in industrial organization make one or more as-
sumption which makes them harder to apply to large ﬁrm-level data sets. In particular,
they typically assume that products are vertically but not horizontally differentiated;
and/or that the number of products produced by a ﬁrm is ﬁxed, so the key question of in-
terest iswhere in quality space itwill choose to locate; and/or that the number of products
produced is relatively small. For examples from a large literature, see Brander and Eaton
(1984), Klemperer (1992), and Johnson and Myatt (2003). Baldwin and Ottaviano
(2001) apply this kind of model in a trade context.symmetric on both the demand and supply sides, with the motivation
for producing a range of products coming from economies of scope. As
a result, all products sell in the same amount and at the same price6.
A different approach, pioneered by Bernard et al. (2010, 2011),
emphasizes asymmetries between products on the demand side due
to exogenous stochastic factors. Before they decide to enter, ﬁrms
draw their overall level of productivity and also a set of product-
market-speciﬁc demand shocks. The latter determine the ﬁrm's scale
and scope of sales in different markets, and imply that its price and
output proﬁles are always positively correlated. By contrast, Eckel and
Neary (2010) develop a model that emphasizes asymmetries between
products on the cost side and implies that price and output proﬁles
are always negatively correlated.7
The present paper integrates these demand and cost approaches in
an endogenous way. We extend the “ﬂexible manufacturing” approach
of Eckel and Neary (2010) by allowing costs to affect the proﬁle of
investment in quality across different varieties, and develop a model
which is more in line with recent work on models of heterogeneous
ﬁrms that engage in process R&D: see, for example, Bustos (2011) and
Lileeva and Treﬂer (2010) on single-product ﬁrms, and Dhingra
(2013) on multi-product ﬁrms. It is even more closely related to those
papers which allow for endogenous investment in quality, such as
Antoniades (2009) and Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), including the
view that quality is really perceived quality, which may be market-
speciﬁc, so investment in quality includes spending on marketing as in
Arkolakis (2010). All this work has so far focused on single-product
ﬁrms only. Our speciﬁcation iswe believe theﬁrst to incorporate invest-
ment in quality into amodel of multi-product ﬁrms, combining insights
fromextensive literatures in both industrial organization andmarketing
science. From the former, especially Stigler and Becker (1977), we take
the view that ﬁrms invest in perceived quality through advertising,
which enters the utility function directly in away that is complementary
to consumption itself. From the latter, notably Jacoby et al. (1971),
Boush et al. (1987), and Aaker and Keller (1990), we take the view
that consumers of multi-product ﬁrms are affected both by product-
speciﬁc marketing and by advertising of a ﬁrm's overall brand, and
that the relative effectiveness of the former is greater when products
are more differentiated.
This brief review of the literature on multi-product ﬁrms highlights
our main interest: how the theoretical models differ in the way they
model the demand for and the decision to supply multiple products.
The models also differ in other ways which are of less interest in the
present application. One type of difference is in the assumptions made
about market structure. In particular, most recent models assume that
markets can be characterized by monopolistic competition, in which
ﬁrms produce a large number of products but are themselves inﬁnites-
imal relative to the size of the overall market.8 By contrast, Eckel and
Neary (2010) assume in their core model that markets are oligopolistic.
In this paper, we know little about the market environment facing
individual ﬁrms: we do not know with which other Mexican plants in
the sample they compete directly, and we have no information at all
on their foreign competitors. Hence we prefer to remain agnostic on
this issue, where possible deriving predictions which will hold at the
level of individual ﬁrms irrespective of the market structure in which
they operate. A further dimension of difference concerns the level of
analysis, whether partial or general equilibrium. Some of the trade
theory papers, including Eckel and Neary (2010), highlight general-
equilibrium adjustments working through factor markets as an impor-
tant channel of transmission of external shocks. However, with the6 See, for example, Allanson andMontagna (2005), Feenstra and Ma (2008), Ju (2003),
Nocke and Yeaple (2014), and Dhingra (2013).
7 Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) and Mayer et al. (2014) apply this approach to
heterogeneous-ﬁrm models of monopolistic competition with CES and quadratic prefer-
ences, respectively.
8 This is true, for example, of all the theoreticalmodels cited in the preceding paragraph,
including Section 5.1 of Eckel and Neary (2010).
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affected by general-equilibrium adjustments to changes in trade policy.
Hence, we concentrate on testing implications of the model in partial
equilibrium.
Section 2 of the paper presents the model and shows how
differences in technology, tastes and market characteristics determine
whether a multi-product ﬁrm exhibits cost-based or quality-based
competence. Section 3 describes the data and explores the extent to
which they conﬁrm our theoretical predictions. Finally, Section 4
summarizes our results and presents some concluding remarks. The
Appendix supplements and extends the theoretical results of Section 2,
and in particular shows that they extend to a Cournot oligopolistic
market with heterogeneous ﬁrms.
2. The model
As already explained, the paper extends the ﬂexible-manufacturing
model of Eckel and Neary (2010) to allow for the interaction of quality
and cost differences between the varieties produced by a multi-
product ﬁrm. To simplify ideas and notation, we focus in the text on a
single monopoly ﬁrm, but, as we show in Appendix B, all the results
extend to a heterogeneous-ﬁrm industry in which ﬁrms engage in
Cournot competition. Section 2.1 introduces our speciﬁcation of
preferences, while Section 2.2 brieﬂy reviews the earlier model, which
allowed for cost-based competence only, showing how a ﬁrm chooses
its product range, its total sales, and their distribution across varieties
in a single market. Section 2.3 explores the additional complications
which quality-based competence introduce and derives our main
theoretical result, and Section 2.4 considers the model's comparative
static properties.
2.1. Preferences for quantity and quality
Consider a single market, in which each one of L consumers maxi-
mizes a quadratic sub-utility function deﬁned over the consumption
and quality levels of a set eΩ of differentiated products:
u ¼ u1 þ βu2
u1 ¼ a0Q−
1
2
b 1−eð Þ
Z
i ∈ eΩq ið Þ2diþ eQ2
 
; Q ≡
Z
i ∈ eΩq ið Þdi
u2 ¼
Z
i ∈ eΩq ið Þez ið Þdi:
ð1Þ
Utility is additive in a component that depends only on quantities con-
sumed, u1, and one that depends on the interaction of quantity and
quality, u2. The ﬁrst component is a standard quadratic function,
where q(i) denotes the consumption of a single variety and Q denotes
total consumption. 9 The parameter e is an inverse measure of product
differentiation, assumed to lie strictly between zero and one (which
correspond to the extreme cases of independent demands and perfect
substitutes respectively). The second component shows that additional
utility accrues from consuming goods of higher quality, whereez ið Þ is the
perceived quality premium attaching to an individual variety. We defer
until Section 2.3 a detailed consideration of how the quality premia ez ið Þ
are determined.
As discussed in the introduction, we remain agnostic in the paper
about whether this sub-utility function is embedded in a general- or
partial-equilibrium model: our analysis is compatible with both ap-
proaches. All we need is to assume that the marginal utility of income
can be set equal to one. This is ensured if the sub-utility function (1) is9 It is well-known that, with these preferences, ﬁrms' mark-ups depend on both mar-
ginal cost and product quality, which would not be the case in a CES preference system.
In this respect, it is the CES case that is special rather than the quadratic: any preference
system which generates demands that are less convex than CES demands (e.g., the
Stone-Geary, CARA or translog) implies thatmark-ups are increasing in sales. SeeMrázová
and Neary (2013) for further discussion.part of a quasi-linear upper-tier utility function, with all income effects
concentrated on the “numéraire” good. Alternatively, as in Eckel and
Neary (2010), (1) can be one of a mass of sub-utility functions without
an outside good, with the marginal utility of income set equal to unity
by choice of numéraire. In either case, Eq. (1) is only one of the many
sub-utility functions, corresponding to separable preferences for differ-
ent groups of products. In our empirical work we will allow for the pos-
sibility that key parameters, and especially the product differentiation
parameter e, may vary across markets and countries. To economize on
notation we do not make this explicit in Eq. (1).
Maximization of Eq. (1) subject to the budget constraint
∫
i∈eΩp ið Þq ið Þdi ¼ I (where I is individual expenditure on the set of
differentiated products eΩ) generates linear demand functions for the
typical consumer. These individual demand functions can then be
aggregated over all L identical consumers in the market. Imposing
market-clearing, so sales volume x(i) equal total demand Lq(i), gives
the market inverse demand functions faced by the monopoly ﬁrm:
p ið Þ ¼ a ið Þ−eb 1−eð Þx ið Þ þ eX½ ; i ∈ Ωeb≡ b
L
X ≡
Z
i ∈ Ω
x ið Þdi a ið Þ ¼ a0 þ βez ið Þ: ð2Þ
Here p(i) is the price that consumers are willing to pay for an extra unit
of variety i. This depends negatively on a weighted average of x(i), the
sales of that variety, and X, the total volume of all varieties produced
and consumed in the market. Note that X is deﬁned over the set of
goods actually consumed, Ω, which is a proper subset of the
exogenous set of potential products eΩ; Ω⊂ eΩ. We will show below
howΩ is determined. Finally, the demand price also depends positively,
through the intercept a(i), on the perceived quality of the individual
variety, ez ið Þ.
2.2. Cost-based competence
Consider next the technology and behavior of the ﬁrm in a single
market, which is segmented from the other markets in which the ﬁrm
operates. The ﬁrm's objective is to maximize proﬁts by choosing both
the scale and scope of production, as well as choosing how much to
invest in enhancing the quality of individual varieties and of its overall
brand. We begin by abstracting from the quality dimension in this
sub-section, and recapping the results of Eckel and Neary (2010) for
the casewhere the ﬁrm's competence derives fromdifferences between
varieties in production costs only. This is most easily done by setting β
equal to zero in Eq. (1), so utility does not depend on quality. Though
it is convenient to make explicit the variety-speciﬁc intercepts a(i) in
all equations, we do not consider the implications of differences
between them until the next sub-section.
With no investment in quality, the ﬁrm's problem is to maximize its
operating proﬁts only:
π ¼
Z
i ∈ Ω
p ið Þ−c ið Þ−t½ x ið Þdi ð3Þ
Here t is a uniform trade cost payable by the ﬁrm on all the varieties it
sells. The marginal cost function c(i) embodies an assumption
which Eckel and Neary (2010) identify as a key aspect of ﬂexible
manufacturing: marginal costs differ between varieties and rise as the
ﬁrm moves away from its “core competence” variety, the one with
lowest marginal cost.10 More precisely, the ﬁrm's marginal cost of
production for variety i is independent of the amount produced of that
variety, is lowest for the core-competence variety indexed “0”, and10 We assume that production costs are independent of the market served. Mayer et al.
(2014) add an exogenous market-speciﬁc adaptation cost function which augments the
production costs c(i). With existing data sets, this is observationally equivalent to exoge-
nous market-speciﬁc taste shifts a(i), as in Bernard et al. (2011).
“Core Competence”
iδ
)(ix
)0(x
0a
tc +)0(
tic +)(
)(ip
)0(p
Fig. 1. Proﬁles of outputs, prices and costs with cost-based competence.
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c′(i) N 0. With uniform trade costs included, this is shown by the
upward-sloping locus c(i) + t in Fig. 1.11
To derive the ﬁrm's behavior, we ﬁrst consider the optimal choice of
output for each variety produced, i.e., for all i in the set Ω. In choosing
the output of each variety, the ﬁrm must take account of its effect on
the demand for all the varieties it produces, through the demand func-
tions (Eq. (2)).12 The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to x(i) are:
∂π
∂x ið Þ ¼ p ið Þ−c ið Þ−t½ −
eb 1−eð Þx ið Þ þ eX½  ¼ 0; i ∈ Ω: ð4Þ
These imply that the net price–cost margin for each variety, p(i) −
c(i)− t, equals eb times a weighted average of the output of that variety
and of total output, where theweights depend on the degree of product
substitutability. The presence of total output in this expression reﬂects
the “cannibalization effect”: an increase in the output of one variety
will, from the demand function (2), reduce its sales of all varieties.
Taking this into account induces the ﬁrm to reduce its sales relative to
an otherwise identical multi-divisional ﬁrm where decisions on the
output of each variety were taken independently. 13 Combining the
ﬁrst-order conditions with the demand function (2) we can solve for
the output of each variety as a function of its own cost and of the ﬁrm's
total output:
x ið Þ ¼ a ið Þ−c ið Þ−t−2
ebeX
2eb 1−eð Þ i ∈ Ω: ð5Þ
With a(i) independent of i, the outputs of different varieties are
unambiguously ranked from larger to smaller by their distance from
the ﬁrm's core competence. Hence the problem of choosing the set of
products to produce,Ω, reduces to the problem of choosing the product
range, which we denote by δ. From Eckel and Neary (2010), the ﬁrst-
order condition for choice of δ is that the output of themarginal variety
is exactly zero: x(δ) = 0. Hence the proﬁle of outputs is as shown by
the downward-sloping locus x(i) in Fig. 1. Finally, since demands are
symmetric when a(i) = a0, the prices which will induce this pattern
of demand must be increasing in i. To induce consumers who, ceteris
paribus, are indifferent between varieties to buy more of those closest
to its core competence, the ﬁrm must “pile 'em high and sell 'em
cheap”. This is conﬁrmed when we substitute for outputs x(i) from
Eq. (5) into the ﬁrst-order condition (4) to obtain the proﬁt-maximizing
proﬁle of prices:
p ið Þ ¼ 1
2
a ið Þ þ c ið Þ þ t½ : ð6Þ
Thus prices increase with costs, though less rapidly, implying that the
ﬁrm's mark-up is lower on non-core varieties. However, it makes a
strictly positive mark-up on all varieties: because of the cannibalization11 Figs. 1 to 2 are drawn under the assumption that the cost function c(i) is linear in i.
Though a convenient special case, this assumption is not needed for any of the results.
12 Strictly speaking, the ﬁrm is choosing the whole output schedule {x(i)}, which is a
calculus of variations problem. However, it is helpful to think of it instead as choosing
the output of each variety, one at a time. The ﬁrst-order condition is: ∂π∂x ið Þ ¼
p ið Þ−c ið Þ−t½ −∫
i
0∈Ω
∂p ið Þ
∂x i0
  x i0 di0 ¼ 0. Bearing inmind thatX ¼ ∫
i
0∈Ωx i
0 
di
0
, the effect
of a small change in the output of variety i on prices (Eq. (2)) can be written as: ∂p ið Þ
∂x i0
  ¼
−ebe when i≠ i', and ∂p ið Þ
∂x i0
  ¼−eb ¼−eb 1−eð Þ þ e½  when i= i'. Substituting gives Eq. (4).
13 Each division of such a ﬁrmwould independently set p(i)− c(i)− t equal to ebx ið Þ. In
doing so, it would forego the gains from internalizing the externality which higher output
of one variety imposes on the ﬁrm by reducing the demand for all other varieties. Such a
myopic ﬁrmwould also be indistinguishable from a set of single-productﬁrmswhichhap-
pened to have the same proﬁle of marginal costs. (Thanks to Jonathan Vogel for the latter
point.)effect, it would not be proﬁt-maximizing to set price equal to marginal
cost on the marginal variety x(δ).14 All this is illustrated in Fig. 1.
2.3. Quality-based competence
Consider next the case where consumers care about quality as well
as quantity, so β in the utility function (1) is positive. Consumers there-
fore perceive a quality premiumez ið Þ attaching to each variety, whichwe
assume can be decomposed as follows:
ez ið Þ ¼ 1−eð Þz ið Þ þ eZ ð7Þ
Here z(i) is the variety-speciﬁc component of quality, andZ is the quality
of the ﬁrm's brand as awhole. In the terminology of themarketing liter-
ature, our z(i) includes both “intrinsic cues”, such as the physical charac-
teristics of a product, and “extrinsic cues” such as individual, product-
speciﬁc brand names, both of which inﬂuence consumers' perceptions
of product quality.15 The ﬁrm-wide parameter Z can be thought of as a
“family brand” or “umbrella brand” that affects the perceived quality
of all a ﬁrm's products. 16
Our modeling of preferences and investment in perceived quality
draws on previous work in both industrial organization and marketing
science. Our assumption that both perceived quality and the physical
quantities of goods consumed enter the utility function is consistent
with the “complementary view” of advertising in the industrial organi-
zation literature. This can be traced back to Stigler and Becker (1977,
p. 84), who argue that “utility depends not only on the quantity of
the good but also the consumer's knowledge of its true or alleged prop-
erties” and that “the knowledge, whether real or fancied, is produced
by the advertising of producers”. Bagwell (2007, p. 1720) adds that a
“consumer may value ‘social prestige’, and advertising by a ﬁrm may
be an input that contributes towards the prestige that is enjoyed
when the ﬁrm's product is consumed.” By distinguishing between
product-speciﬁc investments in perceived quality and investments in14 The price–costmargin on themarginal variety isp δð Þ−c δð Þ−t ¼ ebeXN0, using Eq. (4)
and the fact that x(δ) is zero. For amulti-divisional ﬁrmwhich ignored the cannibalization
effect, it would be zero.
15 See Zeithaml (1988) for deﬁnitions and an overview of the marketing literature. Ex-
amples of intrinsic cues come from Fiore and Damhorst (1992), who study how color,
drape, leg shape, and pocket style affect how consumers perceive the quality of trousers.
16 For umbrella brands, see Sullivan (1990). Examples include “Apple”, with product-
speciﬁc brands “iMac”, “iPhone”, “iPad”, etc.; “Colgate”, with “Total Advanced”, “Max
White”, “SpongeBob”, etc.; or “Johnson & Johnson”, with “Band-Aid”, “Johnson's Baby”,
“Listerine”, etc. An example of an umbrella brand that comprises multiple non-branded
products is “Nivea”. For simplicity, we use the term “brand” in the text to refer only to
the ﬁrm-level umbrella brand.
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multi-product setting.
As for our distinction between product- and ﬁrm-level perceived
quality, and our assumption that their relative importance to the
consumer varies with the degree of product differentiation, this draws
on an extensive literature in marketing science. In particular, there is
ample evidence that product-speciﬁc marketing has a stronger impact
on perceived qualitywhen products aremore different, and that a ﬁrm's
overall brand affects the perceived quality of individual varietiesmore if
products are better substitutes. See, for example, Jacoby et al. (1971),
Boush et al. (1987) and Aaker and Keller (1990). These studies justify
our assumption in Eq. (7) that consumers value the variety-speciﬁc
component of quality relatively more than the quality of the ﬁrm's
brand, the greater the degree of product differentiation (i.e., the lower
is e).17 Note that Z is not equal to ∫
i ∈ Ωz ið Þdi , the aggregate of
individual varieties' quality. If varieties are close to independent in
demand (so e is close to zero), then the consumer perceives little beneﬁt
from a higher quality brand in itself. By contrast, if varieties are close
substitutes (so e is close to one), then the consumer attaches more
importance to the quality of the brand as a whole than to that of
individual varieties.
Next, we need to specify how the components of quality z(i) and Z
are determined. It would be possible to assume that the perceived
qualities of different varieties and of the ﬁrm's brand vary exogenously,
perhaps determined by a random process as in Bernard et al. (2010).
However, this would be hard to reconcile with the assumption of
ﬂexible manufacturing, where a ﬁrm's products are ranked by their
distance from its core competence. We assume instead that, in the
absence of investment in quality, consumers are indifferent between
all varieties. The ﬁrm can invest to enhance both the perceived quality
of each of its individual varieties, as well as the perceived quality of its
overall brand.18 As we will see, this generates a rich framework where
differences between varieties are ultimately determined by costs,
but where the proﬁles of outputs and prices may exhibit what we call
“quality-based competence” if investment in quality is sufﬁciently
effective.
To allow for explicit solutions, we assume a linear–quadratic speciﬁ-
cation for the costs of and returns to investment in quality.19 With k(i)
denoting the ﬁrm's investment in the quality of variety i, we assume
that the cost incurred equals γk(i), while the beneﬁts come in the
form of higher quality, though at a diminishing rate: z(i) = 2θk(i)0.5.
Similarly, investment in the quality of the brand incurs costs of ΓK and
raises brand quality at a diminishing rate: Z ¼ 2ΘK0:5. Total ﬁrm proﬁts
in the market are thus given by:
Π ¼
Z
i ∈ Ω
p ið Þ−c ið Þ−tf gx ið Þ−γk ið Þ½ di−ΓK: ð8Þ
Theﬁrst-order conditions for scale and scope are as before. The new fea-
ture is the ﬁrm's optimal choice of investment in quality, which is
determined by the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
ið Þ γk ið Þ0:5 ¼ β 1−eð Þθx ið Þ; i∈ 0; δ½  and iið Þ ΓK0:5 ¼ βeΘX: ð9Þ17 The linear speciﬁcation of Eq. (7) simpliﬁes the derivations but is not essential. We
show in the Appendix, Section 5, that all our results go through if the quality premium
is a general function of z ið Þ; Z and e, with ez ið Þ less responsive to ez ið Þ and more responsive
to Z the higher is e.
18 Brand-speciﬁc investment ranges from neon signs on skyscrapers to sponsorship of
sports and cultural events; variety-speciﬁc investment includes setting up and maintain-
ing websites with detailed speciﬁcations of individual varieties, as well as renting more
or less prominent shelf space in stores to showcase them.
19 Here we follow a large literature on process R&D in both industrial organization and
trade. See for example, d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Leahy and Neary (1997),
Antoniades (2009), Bustos (2011), and Dhingra (2013).The ﬁrst equation shows that the ﬁrmwill invest in the quality of variety
i up to the pointwhere themarginal cost of investmentγ equals itsmar-
ginal return. The latter is increasing in β, the weight that consumers at-
tach to quality as a whole, and in θ, the effectiveness of investment in
raising quality. However, it is decreasing in the substitution parameter
e: as goods become less differentiated the incentive to invest in the
quality of an individual variety falls. Exactly analogous considerations
determine the optimal level of investment in the ﬁrm's brand, with
one key difference: for given total output this is increasing rather than
decreasing in the substitution parameter e. The more consumers view
the ﬁrm's varieties as close substitutes, the greater the pay-off to
investing in the brand.
The relationship between the different components of investment is
highlighted by comparing total investment in the quality of individual
varieties, K ≡ ∫
δ
0
k(i)di, with investment in brand quality K:
K
K
¼ 1−e
e
θ
Θ
Γ
γ
 	2
Φ where : Φ ≡
Z δ
0
x ið Þ2di
X2
: ð10Þ
Not surprisingly, investment in varieties is higher than in the overall
brand the more effective it is (the higher is θ relative to Θ) and the
less expensive it is (the lower is γ relative to Γ). It is also higher the
less substitutable are different varieties (the lower is e). In addition, it
is also higher the greater is Φ, which Eckel and Neary (2010) deﬁne as
an ex post measure of the ﬂexibility of technology of a multi-product
ﬁrm. Intuitively, the more ﬂexible is its technology the more the ﬁrm
wants to differentiate its marketing spending across different varieties;
by contrast, if Φ is low, the distribution of outputs across varieties is
more even and the ﬁrm will tend to focus on promoting its brand as a
whole.
Consider next the implications of investment in quality for the
pattern of the ﬁrm's sales across varieties. The ﬁrst-order condition (9)-
(i) shows that the ﬁrm will invest more in a variety with greater sales
volume. The latter is endogenous of course, but combining this and
Eq. (9)-(ii) with the expression for outputs in Eq. (5) allows us to
write the output of each variety as a function of exogenous variables
and of total sales only:
x ið Þ ¼
a0−c ið Þ−t−2 eb−ηe eX
2 eb−η 1−eð Þh i 1−eð Þ ; i∈ 0; δ½  η ≡ β
2θ2
γ
η ≡ β
2Θ2
Γ
:
ð11Þ
Here, η and η are composite parameters which we can call, following
Leahy and Neary (1997), the “marginal effectiveness of investment” in
the quality of individual varieties and of the ﬁrm's brand respectively.
So, for example, η is higher the more consumers value quality (the
higher is β), the more effective is investment in quality (the higher is
θ), and the less costly it is (the lower is γ). Note that η and η cannot
be too high: both eb−η 1−eð Þ and eb−ηe must be positive from the
second-order conditions for optimal choice of outputs and investment.
To see the implications of Eq. (11) more clearly, evaluate it at i = δ
and use the fact that the output of the marginal variety is zero,
x(δ) = 0. The output of each variety can then be expressed in terms of
the difference between its own cost and that of the marginal variety:
x ið Þ ¼ c δð Þ−c ið Þ
2 eb−η 1−eð Þh i 1−eð Þ ; i∈ 0; δ½ : ð12Þ
This conﬁrms that the proﬁle of outputs across varieties is the inverse of
the proﬁle of costs: outputs fallmonotonically as the ﬁrmmoves further
away from its core competence. Moreover, it shows that the output pro-
ﬁle is steeper the higher is η. The greater the marginal efﬁciency of in-
vestment in the quality of individual varieties, the more a ﬁrm faces a
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ties, those closer to its core competence, since they have the highest
mark-ups in the absence of investment.
Eq. (12) shows that investment in quality increases the variance of
outputs but does not change their qualitative proﬁle. By contrast, it
can reverse the slope of the ﬁrm's price proﬁle. To see this, substitute
from the expression for output (12) into the ﬁrst-order condition (4)
to solve for the equilibrium prices:
p ið Þ ¼
eb−2η 1−eð Þ
2 eb−η 1−eð Þh i c ið Þ þ
eb
2 eb−η 1−eð Þh i c δð Þ þ t þ ebeX; i∈ 0; δ½ :
ð13Þ
The coefﬁcient of c(i) in this expression gives one of our key results.
Recalling that the denominator must be positive from the second-
order conditions, the slope of the price proﬁle depends on the sign of
the numerator eb−2η 1−eð Þ. When the direct effect of an increase in i,
working through a higher production cost, dominates, the numerator
is positive, and the price proﬁle exhibits “cost-based competence”:
varieties closer to the ﬁrm's core competence must sell at a lower
price to induce consumers to purchase more of them. The extreme
case of this is where investment in the quality of individual varieties is
totally ineffective, so η is zero and the coefﬁcient of c(i) in Eq. (13)
reduces to one half as in the last sub-section. By contrast, if the indirect
effect of an increase in i, working through a higher value of a(i), is
sufﬁciently strong, so the ﬁrm invests disproportionately in the quality
of products closer to its core competence, then it charges higher
prices for them, and the price proﬁle slopes downwards, as illustrated
in Fig. 2. We call this case one of “quality-based competence”.
Summarizing:
Proposition 1. The proﬁle of prices across varieties increases with
their distance from the ﬁrm's core competence if ebN2η 1−eð Þ, whereas it
decreases with the distance if eb b 2η 1−eð Þ b 2eb.
Proposition 1 gives the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for each
outcome, but for completeness and because we will draw on them in
the empirical section, it is useful to spell out its implications:
Corollary 1. Quality-based competence, the case where prices of different
varieties are positively correlated with sales, is more likely to dominate:
(i) when investment in quality is more effective, so η is larger; (ii) when
market size L is larger, so eb is smaller; and (iii) when products are more
differentiated, so e is smaller.
This result has been derived the case of a singlemonopoly ﬁrm, but it
is independent of the extent of competition which the ﬁrm faces. Wetc +)0(
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Fig. 2. Proﬁles of outputs, prices and costs with quality-based competence.show formally in the Appendix that it continues to hold in a
heterogeneous-ﬁrms Cournot oligopoly market, but the intuition is
straightforward. With all goods symmetrically differentiated, ﬁrms
compete against each other only at the level of total output, not at the
level of individual varieties. Changes in the extent of inter-ﬁrm compe-
tition affect the scale and scope of production as well as the level of
investment in quality, but do not inﬂuence the within-ﬁrm proﬁle of
prices across products, which is the focus of our empirical analysis.
It should be noted that our distinction between cost- and quality-
based competence is an ex post one, based on the observable correlation
between the slopes of the price and sales proﬁles. In a fundamental
sense, aﬁrm's core competence in ourmodel is always based onproduc-
tion costs, since these determine the ﬁrm's incentives to invest in
improving the quality of different varieties. It is also possible to consider
how the ﬁrm's “full marginal costs”, i.e., its marginal production cost
plus the average cost of investing in the quality of each variety, varies
as it moves away from its core competence. Combining the ﬁrst-order
condition for investment with the expression for output in Eq. (12),
the average cost of investing in the quality of each variety can be
shown to equal:
γ
k ið Þ
x ið Þ ¼
η 1−eð Þ
2 eb−η 1−eð Þh i c δð Þ−c ið Þ½ ; i∈ 0; δ½ : ð14Þ
Hence the full marginal cost equals:
c ið Þ þ γ k ið Þ
x ið Þ ¼
2eb−3η 1−eð Þ
2 eb−η 1−eð Þh i c ið Þ þ η 1−eð Þ2 eb−η 1−eð Þh i c δð Þ; i∈ 0; δ½ : ð15Þ
Combining this with Proposition 1, we can conclude that neither mar-
ginal production costs nor full marginal costs predict the proﬁle of
prices across varieties. There are three cases:
(i) If cost-based competence dominates, so η 1−eð Þ b 12eb, then both
prices and full marginal costs rise with i.
(ii) If quality-based competence dominates, but mildly, so 12
eb b η
1−eð Þ b 23eb, then prices fall with i but full marginal costs rise
with i.
(iii) If quality-based competence strongly dominates, so 23
eb b η
1−eð Þ b eb, then both prices and full marginal costs fall with i.
Note that in case (ii), bothmeasures of cost risewith i, despitewhich
prices fall with i. However, the mark-up over full marginal cost, μ(i), is
always decreasing in i, and takes a particularly simple form:
μ ið Þ≡ p ið Þ− c ið Þ þ γ k ið Þ
x ið Þ

 
¼ 1
2
c δð Þ−c ið Þ½  þ t þ ebeX; i∈ 0; δ½ : ð16Þ
This is independent of η and η for the given X and δ. Hence the relative
contribution of different varieties to total proﬁts is independent of the
effectiveness of investment in quality: μ ið Þ−μ i0  ¼− 12 c ið Þ−c i0  .
2.4. Comparative statics
The predictions of the model for the shape of the ﬁrm's equilibrium
price proﬁle given in Proposition 1 are the ones that we take to the data
in the next section. It is also of interest to explore the comparative
statics properties of the model. Here we note the effects of exogenous
shocks on the scale and scope of a single monopoly ﬁrm, while in the
Appendix we show that our results generalize to the case of a group of
ﬁrms engaged in Cournot competition.
With a continuum of ﬁrst-order conditions for both outputs and
investment levels, it might seemdifﬁcult to derive the comparative stat-
ics of the equilibrium. However, we can follow the approach used in
Eckel and Neary (2010) to express the equilibrium in terms of two
Table 1
Comparative statics responses.
Increase in: η η t L
X + + − +
x(0) + + − +
δ + − − +/−
21 For a more complete account, see Iacovone and Javorcik (2007).
22 Maquiladoras aremostly foreign-ownedplants located close to the U.S. border, almost
exclusively engaged in assembling imported inputs for export.
23 The classiﬁcation systemhas a total of 4085potential products. However, this includes
headings entitled “Other unspeciﬁed products” and “Other non-generic products” in each
clase. Excluding the latter, 3183 is the number of products actually produced at somepoint
in the sample period. For comparison, theUSproduction data at the ﬁve-digit SIC code lev-
el used by Bernard et al. (2010) contain approximately 1800 product codes, while the US
export data used by Bernard et al. (2011) contain approximately 8000 product codes,
though these include agricultural products and raw materials as well as manufactures.
24 For instance, the clase of Distilled Alcoholic Beverages (identiﬁed by the CMAP code
313014) lists 13 products: gin, vodka, whisky, other distilled alcoholic beverages, coffee li-
queurs, “habanero” liqueurs, “rompope”, prepared cocktails, hydroalcoholic extract, and
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evaluate Eq. (11) at themarginal variety i= δ, recalling that x(δ) equals
zero. This yields one equation in X and δ:
c δð Þ ¼ a0−t−2 eb−ηe eX: ð17Þ
Next, consider the alternative expression for individual outputs,
Eq. (12), and integrate it over i to obtain a second equation:
X ¼
Z δ
0
c δð Þ−c ið Þ½ di
2 eb−η 1−eð Þh i 1−eð Þ : ð18Þ
These two equations can now be solved for X and δ and the result for X
plugged back into Eq. (11) to solve for the outputs of individual
varieties. Table 1 gives the implications for the effects on ﬁrm behavior
of increases in themarginal effectiveness of either kind of investment, in
market access costs, and in market size.
An increase in the marginal effectiveness of investment in brand
quality, η, is neutral across varieties, and so it leads the ﬁrm to expand
in both size and scope. By contrast, an increase in themarginal effective-
ness of investment in the quality of individual varieties, η, accentuates
the incentive to focus on the ﬁrm's core competence. Hence it leads to
what Eckel and Neary (2010) call a “leaner and meaner” response: a
rise in total output but a fall in scope. As for an increase inmarket access
costs t, this induces a contraction in both scale and scope. The only
ambiguity in the table is the effect of an increase in market size L on
scope. While the ﬁrm always sells more in total in a larger market, this
may or may not come with an increase in scope. The outcome depends
on the relative effectiveness of the two kinds of investment and on the
degree of substitutability in demand between varieties:
dδ
dL
∝ ηe−η 1−eð Þ: ð19Þ
Thus,more varieties are sold in a largermarket, the less products are dif-
ferentiated (the higher is e), and the more effective is investment in
brand quality relative to investment in the quality of individual varieties
(the higher is η relative to η).20
All these results are proved in the Appendix in the general case with
heterogeneous multi-product ﬁrms, both home and foreign-based,
engaging in oligopolistic competition. We show there that the results
continue to hold without qualiﬁcation, except for the effects of market
size. An increase in market size raises the output of all ﬁrms if they are
identical. However, with heterogeneous ﬁrms, the outcome exhibits
a “superstar ﬁrms” tendency as in Neary (2010). Firms with above
average total output Xj and output per variety Xj/δj tend to grow faster
with market size, while those below average grow more slowly or
may even suffer falls in output as they are squeezed by larger more
proﬁtable ﬁrms. As a result, the size distribution of ﬁrms becomes
more dispersed. This tendency is not peculiar to markets with multi-
product ﬁrms, but is a general feature of Cournot competition between
heterogeneous ﬁrms that invest in R&D or quality. As we show in the
Appendix, even when goods are homogeneous (e = 1), so ﬁrms are
single-product, an increase in market size still implies the “superstar
ﬁrms” result. Only when η j ¼ η j ¼ 0, so there is no investment, does
an increase in market size leave the initial distribution of output across
ﬁrms unchanged: dlnX jdlnL ¼ 1 and
dlnδ j
dlnL ¼ 0 for all j and for all e, 0 ≤ e ≤ 1.20 We show in the Appendix, Section 5, that, with appropriate restrictions, this result
continues to hold when the quality premium is a general function of z(i) and Z.3. Empirics
Our theoretical model makes a number of novel predictions about
the behavior of multi-product ﬁrms. One of these in particular is unique
to our model, has both theoretical and policy interest, and lends itself to
empirical testing with our data. This is the prediction from Corollary 1
that the proﬁle of prices across the different goods produced by a
multi-product ﬁrm is more likely to be positively correlated with the
corresponding proﬁle of outputs, thus exhibiting what we have called
quality-based competence, when products are more differentiated. In
the remainder of the paper we subject this prediction to empirical
testing. We ﬁrst describe the data and document the proﬁles of sales
across ﬁrms' products which it exhibits; then we explain how we
operationalize the prediction about price proﬁles; subsequent sub-
sections present the results of testing it and consider various robustness
checks.3.1. The data
We begin by reviewing the data set.21 A unique characteristic of our
data is the availability of plant-product level information on the value
and the quantity of sales for both domestic and export markets. Our
data source is the Encuesta Industrial Mensual (EIM) administered by
the Instituto Nacional de Estadstica Geografa e Informática (INEGI) in
Mexico. The EIM is a monthly survey conducted to monitor short-
term trends and dynamics in the manufacturing sector. As we are not
primarily interested in short-term ﬂuctuations, we aggregate the
monthly EIM data into annual observations. The survey covers about
85%ofMexican industrial output,with the exception of “maquiladoras”.22
It includes information on 3183 unique products produced by over
6000 plants.23 Plants are asked to report both values and quantities of
total production, total sales, and export sales for each product produced,
making the data set particularly valuable for our purposes. Note that the
unit of observation is the plant rather than the ﬁrm: we return to this
issue in our robustness checks below.
Products in the survey are grouped into 205 clases, or activity classes,
corresponding to the 6-digit level CMAP (Mexican System of Classiﬁca-
tion for Productive Activities) classiﬁcation. Each clase contains a list
of possible products, which was developed in 1993 and remained
unchanged during the entire period under observation. The classiﬁca-
tion of products is similar in level of detail to the 6-digit international
Harmonized System classiﬁcation, though with differences that reﬂect
special features of the structure of Mexican industrial production.24other alcoholic beverages prepared from either agave, brandy, rum, or tablewine. Howev-
er, it does not include tequila, which is included, alongwith six other related products, in a
separate clase, Produccion de Tequila y Mezcal (identiﬁed by the CMAP code 313011).
Table 2
Number of plants and products.
Year Number of plants Number of products
Total Owned by
MPFs1
Other Exporters Produced Exported
Total Adjusted2
1994 6291 1259 5032 1582 1579 19,154 2844
1995 6011 1245 4766 1844 1842 18,568 3406
1996 5747 1256 4491 2024 2023 17,662 3881
1997 5538 1256 4282 2138 2137 16,938 4092
1998 5380 1268 4112 2095 2094 16,419 4193
1999 5230 1279 3951 1951 1950 15,885 3889
2000 5100 1280 3820 1901 1899 15,279 3737
2001 4927 1258 3669 1770 1766 14,714 3509
2002 4765 1237 3528 1686 1684 14,182 3321
2003 4603 1193 3410 1678 1675 13,507 3282
2004 4424 1159 3265 1602 1599 12,887 3118
Total 58,016 13,690 44,326 20,271 20,248 175,195 39,272
1 MPFs: Multi-plant ﬁrms; information on the number of plants owned by each ﬁrm is
available for 2003 only.
2 The adjusted data exclude plants not reporting production in the year in question.
28 Putting this differently, the utility function written in terms of observable quantities
contains unobservable product-speciﬁcweights. This issue is familiar in the CES literature:
see in particular Feenstra (1994) who notes that it makes the aggregate price level unob-
servable, but that a Sato-Vartia true index of the change in prices between periods can
nonetheless be calculated. We are not aware of any study which addresses this issue with
quadratic preferences, so we hope that our approach may be of general interest.
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6291 in 1994 to 4424 in 2004. Between 1579 and 2137 plants were
engaged in exporting.25 The decline in the number of establishments
during the period under analysis is due to exit.26 In our empirical
analysis, consistent with our theoretical model, we refer to each plant-
product combination as a “variety”. The number of varieties sold ranges
from 19,154 in 1994 to 12,887 in 2004, while the number of varieties
exported rose from 2844 in 1994 to 3118 in 2004, reaching a peak of
4193 in 1998.
3.2. Sales proﬁles
As a ﬁrst step in exploring the properties of the data through the lens
of our theoretical model, we considered the patterns of sales across the
varieties produced by different plants in our sample. (Details are given
in a background paper: Eckel et al. (2009)). The results were consistent
with the model presented in Section 2, and also broadly in line with
empirical patterns found in other recent studies of multi-product
ﬁrms.27 In particular, the data show that exporting plants are larger,
and that larger plants produce more products. The vast majority of
plants sell more products at home, and most exported products are
also sold at home. Finally, the proﬁle of sales across products is highly
non-uniform, with a broadly similar ranking of products by sales in
the home and foreign markets.
3.3. Empirical strategy
Consider next the theoretical prediction which is unique to our
model: if and only if bL b 2η 1−eð Þ , then quality-based competence
should prevail, so prices fall with distance from a ﬁrm's core compe-
tence, or, equivalently, prices and sales values are positively correlated
across a ﬁrm's products. In our theoretical section we showed that this
holds for a single ﬁrm or (as shown in the Appendix) for a group of
ﬁrms competing against each other in an oligopolistic market. Given
our large data set, it is natural to explore how this prediction fares
when we consider different values of the exogenous variables, η, L
and e. Unfortunately, we cannot observe the marginal effectiveness of
investment η, which is itself a composite of parameters representing
the costs and beneﬁts to the ﬁrm of investment in product quality. As
for market size L, the condition for quality-based competence states
that it is more likely to hold the larger the market. However, we should
be careful of interpreting this too literally: since we do not have data on
sales in individual export markets, we cannot take for granted that the
rest of the world is a larger market than the domestic Mexican market.
This will be true for some ﬁrms but not for others, depending on the
foreign customers they target and on their past history of investment
inmarketing and product quality. This leaves only the degree of product
differentiation e. Fortunately, thanks to Rauch (1999), we have good
information on which goods are more differentiated. Hence we can
test the implication of the model that more differentiated products are
more likely to exhibit a quality-based price proﬁle.
How do we operationalize testing this prediction in a theory-
consistent way? In our theoretical model, all goods are symmetrically
differentiated, and so they are directly comparable with one another
both in terms of prices and of quantities. By contrast, with real-world
data, different products are measured in different units which are not25 We exclude a very small number of plant-year observations (23 in total) which re-
ported positive exports but no production: see Table 2.
26 Plants that exited after 1994werenot systematically replaced in our sample. This does
not bias our results, as our main focus is on within-year rather than panel features of the
data.
27 See, for example, the studies of Bernard et al. (2010) and Goldberg et al. (2010a), who
look at home production by multi-product ﬁrms in the U.S. and India respectively; and of
Arkolakis and Muendler (2010), Bernard et al. (2011) Berthou and Fontagné (2013), and
Mayer et al. (2014)who applymodels ofmulti-productﬁrms similar to ours to export data
for Brazil, Chile, the U.S. and France.directly comparable.28 Moreover, the units may change over time,
because of changes in product speciﬁcation, package size, etc. To deal
with these problems, we distinguish between true and observed prices.
Let pijt denote the true underlying price of product i from plant j at
time t, exactly as in the theoretical sections above.29 The observed prices
Pijt are related to the true prices by a conversion factor ζit : Pijt≡ ζitpijt.We
assume the conversion factor varieswith i and t, though notwith plant j.
When we take logs of this identity, the conversion factor appears as a
product-year ﬁxed effect.30 This resolves the problem of units of
measurement for our left-hand side variable. As for the right-hand
side, we rank products by sales value rather than volume: sijt ≡ pijtxijt.
As we consider products further from a ﬁrm's core competence, output
deﬁnitely falls but pricemay rise or fall aswe have seen. However, aswe
show in Appendix C, the output effect must dominate. Hence sales
value, like sales volume, unambiguously falls as the ﬁrm moves away
from its core competence, and so can be used as an empirical proxy
for the distance of a product from the ﬁrm's core competence. More-
over, it is a better proxy than sales volume, since it is not affected by
units of measurement: whereas prices are inﬂated by the conversion
factor, sales are deﬂated:
Pi jt ≡ ζ itpi jt ; Xi jt ≡ xi jt=ζ it ⇒ si jt ≡ pi jtxi jt ¼ Pi jtXi jt ð20Þ
Hence, measured sales volume Xijt, like measured price Pijt, depends on
units, but their product sijt does not.
In all the tables below, the estimating equation is therefore:
lnPi jt ¼ β0 þ
Xδ jt
r¼1
βrD
r
i jt þωit þ ν jt þ εi jt : ð21Þ29 In practice we measure prices throughout by unit values, equal to sales value divided
by sales quantity.
30 In effect, this deﬂates each price by the geometric mean of the prices of all varieties of
the same product produced in or exported from all Mexican plants in the same year. In
earlier versions of this paper, we adopted a different approach, taking as our dependent
variable the log of each price deﬂated by the arithmetic mean of the prices of all varieties
of the same product produced or exported in the same year. (We experimentedwith both
unweighted averages and with averages weighted by domestic or export sales.) This
“price premium” approach has the advantage of greater transparency, whereas using
product-year ﬁxed effects is more conventional econometrically. Both approaches yield
very similar results.
Table 3
Price proﬁles for all plants selling ﬁve or more products.
Market: Home Export
Varieties: All Diff. Non-diff. All Diff. Non-diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Top product 0.091***
[0.010]
0.109***
[0.013]
0.031***
[0.012]
0.162***
[0.058]
0.205***
[0.063]
−0.138*
[0.071]
Top 2nd 0.072***
[0.009]
0.097***
[0.012]
0.001
[0.010]
0.179***
[0.063]
0.223***
[0.074]
−0.072
[0.062]
Top 3rd 0.064***
[0.009]
0.077***
[0.011]
0.021**
[0.010]
0.178***
[0.052]
0.237***
[0.059]
−0.132**
[0.059]
Top 4th 0.058***
[0.009]
0.069***
[0.011]
0.024***
[0.009]
0.059
[0.053]
0.076
[0.062]
−0.100*
[0.054]
R2 0.972 0.970 0.976 0.978 0.976 0.990
N 73,154 52,878 20,276 8932 6720 2212
***, **, and * denote coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respec-
tively; all regressions have product-year and plant-year ﬁxed effects; and ﬁgures in paren-
theses are standard errors which are clustered by plant-year.
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i from plant j at time t; Dijtr is a dummy variable, which equals one if
product i is ranked r in the value of production or exports of plant j in
year t, and zero otherwise; ωit ≡ lnζit is a product-year ﬁxed effect; νjt
is a plant-year ﬁxed effect; and εijt is a stochastic error term. The
product-year ﬁxed effects control for differences between true and
observed prices as already discussed; while the plant-year ﬁxed effects
control for differences in overall efﬁciency between plants as shown by
the unit cost terms on the right-hand side of our key equation (13). We
present results for a range of values of the number of products δjt
produced by a plant in a given year, trading off the improvement in
the ﬁne detail of the price proﬁle which we are able to estimate against
the loss of degrees of freedomaswe excludemore plantswhichproduce
or export only a small number of products.
We wish to use estimates of Eq. (21) to test the prediction of
Proposition 1 that a higher degree of product differentiation should
make ﬁrms more likely to exhibit a price proﬁle that reﬂects quality-
based rather than cost-based competence. To implement this test, we
need independent observations on the degree of product differentia-
tion, and for this purpose we make use of the classiﬁcation developed
by Rauch (1999). He grouped goods by the Standard International
Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC), Revision 2, four-digit classiﬁcation into
three categories, “differentiated,” “traded on organized exchanges,” or
“reference priced.” We combine the latter two into a catch-all “non-
differentiated” category, and follow many authors in adopting the
so-called “liberal” classiﬁcation, which maximizes the number of
goods classiﬁed as non-differentiated.31 To implement this classiﬁcation
with our Mexican data, we had to make a concordance between the
clases in our data and the SITC system. Fortunately, this was possible
without too much arbitrariness.32 We are thus able to explore how
the relationship between the price and sales proﬁles of multi-product
ﬁrms varies with the degree of product differentiation.
3.4. Results for price proﬁles at home and away
Table 3 gives the results of estimating Eq. (21) over different subsets
of the data on all plant/product/year observations for which the plant in
question sells at least ﬁve products. Each column gives the results of
regressing the corresponding price on product-year and plant-year
ﬁxed effects and on dummy variables for the highest to fourth-highest
selling products. Thus, in the ﬁrst equation, the coefﬁcient 0.091 gives
the estimated price premium on the top-selling product in the home
market relative to the average price on the excluded category of all
products ranked ﬁfth or lower in home sales. This coefﬁcient is highly
signiﬁcant, indicating that, on average, the highest-selling product
from each plant commands a price premium of 9.1% (i.e., exp (0.091)-
1). This provides strong evidence of quality-based competence, in the
sense in which we have used the term in our theoretical model.
The other coefﬁcients in this equation are also highly signiﬁcant, and
fall steadily in size, again conﬁrming a pattern of quality-based compe-
tence. The fourth equation in the table shows that export sales exhibit a
similar pattern on average, with the coefﬁcient on the dummy variable
for the top-selling product equal to 0.162 and highly signiﬁcant, the co-
efﬁcients on the next two not signiﬁcantly different from that of the top-
selling product, and all three signiﬁcantly greater than the last coefﬁ-
cient, for the top fourth-selling product.
The most interesting feature of the table is the pattern of the
estimated coefﬁcients when we disaggregate by type of product31 Our results are robust to excluding reference-priced goods from the sample.
32 Examples of differentiated clases include: 311901: Produccion de chocolate y
golosinas a partir de cocoa o chocolate (production of chocolate and candy from cocoa
or chocolate); 323003: Produccion de maletas, bolsas de mano y similares (production
of suitcases, handbags and similar); and 322005: Confeccion de camisas (ready-to-wear
shirts). Examples of non-differentiated ones include: 311201: Pasteurizacion de leche
(pasteurization of milk); 311404: Produccion de harina de trigo (production of wheat
ﬂour); and 341021: Produccion de papel (production of paper).and by destination. Looking ﬁrst at the second and third equations,
both differentiated and non-differentiated products sold at home
exhibit the same pattern of quality-based competition. However, each
coefﬁcient for differentiated products is signiﬁcantly greater than the
corresponding coefﬁcient for non-differentiated ones, exactly as our
theory predicts.33 This difference between the two categories of
products is repeated but to an even more striking extent in the export
market, as the ﬁfth and sixth equations show. The top three coefﬁcients
for differentiated exports are all highly signiﬁcant and signiﬁcantly
larger than in the home market, implying even higher price premia for
the top-selling products in this category. By contrast, the coefﬁcients
on the top four non-differentiated export products are all negative, im-
plying that these products exhibit cost-based rather than quality-based
competence.
It is worth summarizing the empirical ﬁndings from Table 3,
since the same pattern is repeated, and is nearly always statistically
signiﬁcant, in the vast majority of the equations, estimated for different
groupings of the data, given below:
β^DXr N β^
DH
r N β^
NH
r N 0 N β^
NX
r : ð22Þ
(Here β^DXr is the estimated coefﬁcient of the dummy variable for the dif-
ferentiated product of rank r in the exportmarket, etc. As already noted,
this conﬁguration strongly conﬁrms the predictions of ourmodel for the
degree of product differentiation. Firms producing more differentiated
products face stronger incentives to enhance their perceived quality,
so the extent of quality-based competition is greater for these products.
As for differences across markets, the results show a systematic tenden-
cy for the coefﬁcient on differentiated products to be higher abroad than
at home, whereas this pattern is reversed for non-differentiated prod-
ucts. The signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcients for the top non-
differentiated export products shows that Mexican ﬁrms ﬁnd it harder
to build up brand recognition in these markets, and so are compelled
to compete on cost rather than quality.
So far we have only considered the subset of ﬁrms selling ﬁve or
more products. Tables 4–7 extend the analysis to observations in
which the same plant sold at least two, three or four products in the
one year. In each equation the residual category is all products with
ranks lower than the lowest-ranking dummy variable included, and
the ﬁnal equation is repeated for reference from Table 3. The advantage
of focusing on plants that export fewer than ﬁve products is a consider-
able increase in degrees of freedom, and the results are qualitatively
similar to those in Table 3.33 For example, the difference between the coefﬁcients 0.109 and 0.031 in the second
and thirdequations is signiﬁcant at the10% level. The correspondingdifferences inTables 4
to 7 below are larger and considerably more signiﬁcant.
Table 4
Price proﬁles at home: differentiated products.
Market Home
Plants with 2+ products 3+ products 4+ products 5+ products
Top product 0.040***
[0.008]
0.072***
[0.010]
0.091***
[0.011]
0.109***
[0.013]
Top 2nd 0.059***
[0.009]
0.076***
[0.010]
0.097***
[0.012]
Top 3rd 0.055***
[0.010]
0.077***
[0.011]
Top 4th 0.069***
[0.011]
R2 0.973 0.971 0.970 0.970
N 82,506 72,682 62,218 52,878
***, **, and * denote coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respec-
tively; all regressions have product-year and plant-year ﬁxed effects; and ﬁgures in paren-
theses are standard errors which are clustered by plant-year.
Table 6
Price proﬁles away: differentiated products.
Market Export
Plants with 2+ products 3+ products 4+ products 5+ products
Top product 0.082***
[0.031]
0.123***
[0.044]
0.177***
[0.055]
0.205***
[0.063]
Top 2nd 0.061
[0.043]
0.142**
[0.059]
0.223***
[0.074]
Top 3rd 0.171***
[0.050]
0.237***
[0.059]
Top 4th 0.076
[0.062]
R2 0.985 0.982 0.979 0.976
N 14,975 11,528 8812 6720
***, **, and * denote coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respec-
tively; all regressions have product-year and plant-year ﬁxed effects; and ﬁgures in paren-
theses are standard errors which are clustered by plant-year.
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which Table 3 showed for plants selling ﬁve or more products on the
homemarket also applies to plants selling fewer products. For differen-
tiated products, Table 4 shows that the implied price premium for
the top product ranges from 4.1% when all plants producing two or
more products are included, to 11.5% when only those producing
ﬁve or more are included. In Table 5 the corresponding ﬁgures are
3.9% and 3.1%, showing once again that non-differentiated products ex-
hibit signiﬁcantly less quality-based competition than differentiated
ones, as our theory predicts. Also of considerable interest is that the
pattern of prices falling with a product's rank which was found in
Table 3 continues to hold for the larger samples of plants selling fewer
products. Not only are most coefﬁcients of the dummy variables for
second- and lower-ranking products in these equations signiﬁcantly
different from zero, but there is a clear and in many cases signiﬁcant
downward trend in the coefﬁcients in each column. We can thus con-
clude that there is strong evidence that prices fall with a product's dis-
tance from a plant's core competence, so the price and production
proﬁles are negatively correlated, implying that on average the ﬁrms
in our sample compete on the basis of quality-based competence on
the home market.
Tables 6 and 7 show that export sales behave even more differently
depending on the degree of product differentiation. Consider ﬁrst
Table 6, which shows that the price proﬁle of exports in differentiated
sectors is qualitatively similar to that at home. The evidence for amono-
tonically decreasing proﬁle is less strong in the case of plants producing
ﬁve or more products, although this may be due to the smaller number
of observations in this sub-sample, and in any case the top three
products command a signiﬁcant price premium over products ranked
ﬁfth or lower. Moreover, the quantitative magnitude of the effects is
much higher than in Table 4: the price premium for the top product
ranges from 8.5% when all plants producing two or more products areTable 5
Price proﬁles at home: non-differentiated products.
Market Home
Plants with 2+ products 3+ products 4+ products 5+ products
Top product 0.038***
[0.007]
0.024***
[0.008]
0.023**
[0.010]
0.031***
[0.012]
Top 2nd 0.001
[0.007]
0.006
[0.009]
0.001
[0.010]
Top 3rd 0.019**
[0.008]
0.021**
[0.010]
Top 4th 0.024***
[0.009]
R2 0.984 0.979 0.978 0.976
N 41,698 33,878 26,661 20,276
***, **, and * denote coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respec-
tively; all regressions have product-year and plant-year ﬁxed effects; and ﬁgures in paren-
theses are standard errors which are clustered by plant-year.included, to 22.8%when only those producingﬁve ormore are included,
compared with 4.1% and 11.5% respectively in Table 4.
By contrast, Table 7 tells a very different story for exports of
non-differentiated products. Not a single coefﬁcient in this table is
signiﬁcantly positive, most are negative, and the overall pattern is one
of increasing coefﬁcients as we move down each column. Unlike
Tables 4, 5 and 6, this provides strong evidence against quality-based
competence, and suggestive evidence in favour of cost-based compe-
tence for exports of non-differentiated products. Though not as over-
whelmingly signiﬁcant as the results for differentiated products, the
results imply that the two groups of products behave very differently,
and exactly in the way predicted by Proposition 1. For differentiated
exports, prices fall with their distance from the plant's core competence,
suggesting thatMexican exporters in these sectors compete on the basis
of quality. By contrast, for non-differentiated exports, prices tend to rise
with their distance from the plant's core competence, suggesting that
competition in such sectors is on the basis of cost rather than quality,
exactly as our theory suggests.
Overall, these four tables conﬁrm that the coefﬁcient pattern
summarized in Eq. (22) continues to hold when we consider plants
that sell up to ﬁve or more products.
3.5. Robustness checks
A possible concern with the results so far is that the sample sizes are
very different in different tables, with more products produced for the
home market than for exports. This is perfectly consistent with our
model which predicts that higher costs of accessing a foreign market
will reduce the range of products sold there. Nevertheless it might
suggest a concern that the regularities we have found in our data reﬂect
behavior very different from that predicted by our model; for example,
that plants sell different products in the home and foreign markets, orTable 7
Price proﬁles away: non-differentiated products.
Market Export
Plants with 2+ products 3+ products 4+ products 5+ products
Top product −0.018
[0.030]
−0.001
[0.037]
−0.049
[0.052]
−0.138*
[0.071]
Top 2nd 0.032
[0.033]
0.009
[0.046]
−0.072
[0.062]
Top 3rd −0.016
[0.040]
−0.132**
[0.059]
Top 4th −0.100*
[0.054]
R2 0.994 0.993 0.991 0.990
N 7354 5131 3365 2212
***, **, and * denote coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respec-
tively; all regressions have product-year and plant-year ﬁxed effects; and ﬁgures in paren-
theses are standard errors which are clustered by plant-year.
Table 8
Price proﬁles for products both exported and sold at home: plants with ﬁve or more
products.
Market Home Export
Varieties All Diff. Non-diff. All Diff. Non-diff.
Top product 0.186***
[0.061]
0.208***
[0.066]
0.015
[0.091]
0.188***
[0.064]
0.217***
[0.066]
−0.129
[0.092]
Top 2nd 0.171***
[0.063]
0.198***
[0.069]
−0.024
[0.090]
0.213***
[0.071]
0.236***
[0.077]
−0.015
[0.086]
Top 3rd 0.204***
[0.057]
0.232***
[0.062]
0.016
[0.088]
0.188***
[0.057]
0.228***
[0.062]
−0.110
[0.069]
Top 4th 0.010
[0.060]
0.009
[0.067]
−0.043
[0.062]
0.073
[0.061]
0.087
[0.066]
−0.099
[0.069]
R2 0.980 0.979 0.993 0.975 0.973 0.992
N 7399 5708 1691 7399 5708 1691
***, **, and * denote coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respec-
tively; all regressions have product-year and plant-year ﬁxed effects; and ﬁgures in paren-
theses are standard errors which are clustered by plant-year.
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that sell only on the homemarket. To address these concerns we reesti-
mate our price proﬁle equations ﬁrst for those products that are sold on
both markets, and next for the home sales of exporting plants. We also
present results for various subsets of the data, including ﬁrms with only
a single plant and plants that are either domestically- or foreign-owned.
Table 8 addresses the issue of different sample sizes directly by
reestimating the equations for only those observations on products
that are both exported and sold at home, so the numbers of observations
are the same at home and abroad. It can be seen that the conclusions
drawn from the earlier tables survive this robustness check. There is
clear evidence of quality-based competition in differentiated products
in both home and foreign markets, and this contrasts with the absence
of a pattern in the coefﬁcients for non-differentiated products. Even in
the latter case, the size and sign of the coefﬁcients, though not their
signiﬁcance, are consistent with those from the larger samples in
Table 3. We can conclude that the evidence from this smaller sample
is less overwhelmingly in support of different behavior by non-
differentiated product plants at home and away; but that the evidence
for a difference between behavior by plants in differentiated and non-
differentiated sectors remains strong in both domestic and export
markets.
Table 9 addresses the question of whether plants that select
into exporting behave differently on the home market. It gives results
for home sales by export plants in both differentiated and non-
differentiated clases, and it is clear that the two behave very similarly
to the corresponding samples of all plants selling on the home market,
as in Tables 4 and 5. Once again, home sales of differentiated products
exhibit quality-based competence, while those of non-differentiated
products do not. Bearing in mind that the plants in Table 9 are identical
to those whose exporting behavior is shown in Tables 6 and 7, our
earlier conclusions are reinforced. Exporting plants in differentiated
sectors exhibit quality-based competence in the homemarket, whereas
those in non-differentiated sectors do not, so the very different behavior
of exporters in non-differentiated sectors shown in Table 7 does not
reﬂect any differential selection process of plants into exporting.
A different robustness check addresses the concern that our theory
was developed for multi-product ﬁrms, whereas our data consist of
observations on multi-product plants. Treating plants as the unit of
observation ignores the interdependence of decision-making within
multi-plant ﬁrms. To deal with this problem empirically we would ide-
ally like to have data on the ownership patterns of plants in all years.
Unfortunately, we can only identify which plants were owned by the
same ﬁrm in the penultimate year of our sample, 2003. We therefore
adopt the following strategy. We retain in the sample only those plants
which were single-plant ﬁrms in 2003, and consider their sales and
price proﬁles in all years. This risks including some observations on
plants which did not correspond to single-plant ﬁrms either in 2004 be-
cause of mergers and acquisitions, or in years prior to 2003 because of
divestitures. However, the number of such cases is likely to be small,
and this strategy seems preferable to losingmanymore degrees of free-
dom by focusing on single-plant ﬁrms in 2003 only.34
Table 10 gives the results of this robustness check, for single-plant
ﬁrms selling at least ﬁve products. The evidence for quality-based
competence remains very strong for both categories of home sales and
for differentiated exports. For these three categories, most coefﬁcients
are highly signiﬁcant, implying that products closer to the core sell for
higher prices than the non-core products in the default category of
each equation. As for exports of non-differentiated products, the
evidence for cost-based competence is weaker than in earlier tables,
though the hypothesis that these sales exhibit quality-based compe-
tence is strongly rejected. We can conclude that our earlier results are
robust to excluding plants owned by multi-plant ﬁrms in 2003.34 Results for 2003 alone have similar coefﬁcients to those reported here, but with larger
standard errors.A ﬁnal concern we address is whether our speciﬁcation is more
applicable to Mexican-owned plants or to foreign-owned ones. On the
one hand, we would expect the decisions of foreign-owned Mexican
plants to be taken as part of the global operations of their parent multi-
national companies rather than on a stand-alone basis, at least for sales
in their export markets, and perhaps in their home market too. This
would suggest that the considerationswe have highlighted in our theo-
reticalmodel should applymore toMexican-ownedplants. On the other
hand,wewould expectmultinational companies to have strongerworld
brands and so to exhibit more quality-based competence in all markets.
It seems appropriate therefore to check whether the results hold when
we consider the two groups of plants separately. Tables 11 and 12 show
that the pattern summarized in Eq. (22) continues to hold for both
groups of plants, though there are interesting differences between
them. First, domestically-owned plants have almost ﬂat price proﬁles
in export markets, showing that even in differentiated sectors these
plants do not compete on quality, though the results suggest that non-
differentiated exports come closer to exhibiting cost-based competence.
Second, foreign-owned plants compete strongly on quality even in the
home market, as we might expect, leveraging their superior brands
even in non-differentiated sectors. But they too compete more on cost
in export non-differentiated sectors, showing that their exports of
these goods do not command quality premia. Overall, the broad pattern
from previous tables is conﬁrmed for both groups of plants, and is most
pronounced for foreign-owned plants.
4. Conclusion
This paper has developed a newmodel of multi-product production
in which ﬁrms invest to improve the quality of their products as well as
the quality of their overall brand. It is thus the ﬁrst to integrate two
important strands of recent work on the behavior of ﬁrms in interna-
tional markets. On the one hand, the growing evidence that many
ﬁrms, and especially most large exporters, are multi-product, has
inspired theoretical and empirical work which focuses on the “intra-
ﬁrm extensive margin”, changes in the range of products produced by
ﬁrms, distinct from the inter-ﬁrm extensivemargin which has attracted
so much attention in the literature on heterogeneous single-product
ﬁrms. On the other hand, an increasing number of authors have
suggested that successful ﬁrms in international markets compete on
the basis of superior quality rather than superior productivity. Our
model integrates these two strands in a tractable framework. Crucially,
it endogenizes both the choice of product range and the choice of
quality, or more speciﬁcally, the choice of investment in quality, thus
allowing a range of issues to be explored which have so far been little
studied.
The model has interesting implications for the manner in which
ﬁrms compete in international markets. In particular, it throws light
Table 9
Price proﬁles for home sales of exporting plants.
Market Home
Varieties Differentiated Non-differentiated
Top product: 0.033**
[0.014]
0.068***
[0.017]
0.104***
[0.020]
0.131***
[0.023]
0.017
[0.014]
0.000
[0.018]
−0.011
[0.022]
−0.018
[0.026]
Top 2nd: 0.054***
[0.016]
0.078***
[0.019]
0.118***
[0.022]
0.024
[0.019]
0.03
[0.022]
−0.007
[0.025]
Top 3rd: 0.085***
[0.018]
0.111***
[0.021]
0.011
[0.019]
−0.016
[0.023]
Top 4th: 0.105***
[0.023]
−0.001
[0.024]
R2 0.976 0.974 0.972 0.971 0.986 0.982 0.983 0.982
N 40,068 34,869 29,812 25,168 18,924 14,627 10,936 7769
***, **, and * denote coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; all regressions have product-year and plant-year ﬁxed effects; and ﬁgures in parentheses are
standard errors which are clustered by plant-year.
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ful export performance, and suggests a way of reconciling these two
views. Because of ﬂexible manufacturing, ﬁrms produce more of
products closer to their core competence. They also have incentives to
invest more in the quality of those goods. These two effects have
opposite implications for the proﬁle of prices. On the one hand, to the
extent that consumers view all products as symmetrically differentiated
substitutes for each other,ﬁrms can only sellmore of their core products
by charging lower prices for them. Hence, the direct effect of lower
production costs for core products is that ﬁrms “pile 'em high and sell
'em cheap,” implying that the proﬁles of prices and sales should be
negatively correlated, an outcome we call “cost-based competence”.
On the other hand, ﬁrms face stronger incentives to invest in raising
the perceived quality of their core products, since these are the products
with the highest mark-ups. Even though investment in the quality of an
individual product is subject to diminishing returns, this implies that
ﬁrms will invest more in the quality of their core products, so raising
the price which consumers are willing to pay for them. This indirect
effect of lower production costs for core products implies that the
proﬁles of prices and sales should be positively correlated, an outcome
we call “quality-based competence”. We show that both these out-
comes are possible in our model, and that which of them prevails
depends on a number of exogenous factors. In particular, the greater
the degree of product differentiation, the more the ﬁrm faces differen-
tial incentives to invest in the quality of different products, and so the
more likely is the indirect effect to dominate, giving rise to quality-
based competence. We prove these results in the text for the case of a
single multi-product ﬁrm, and show in the Appendix that they also
hold in an oligopolistic model with heterogeneous ﬁrms.
This last prediction is the one we explore empirically, drawing on a
unique data set on Mexican plants already used by Iacovone and
Javorcik (2007, 2010). A great advantage of this data set is that it gives
detailed information on both home and foreign sales at the same levelTable 10
Price proﬁles for single-plant ﬁrms with ﬁve or more products.
Market Home Export
Varieties All Diff. Non-diff. All Diff. Non-diff.
Top product: 0.103***
[0.012]
0.116***
[0.015]
0.049***
[0.015]
0.191**
[0.087]
0.210**
[0.090]
−0.042
[0.132]
Top 2nd: 0.077***
[0.011]
0.095***
[0.013]
0.015
[0.013]
0.236**
[0.097]
0.281***
[0.105]
−0.105
[0.108]
Top 3rd: 0.076***
[0.010]
0.086***
[0.013]
0.037***
[0.013]
0.192**
[0.077]
0.232***
[0.081]
−0.147
[0.109]
Top 4th: 0.066***
[0.010]
0.076***
[0.012]
0.030**
[0.012]
0.083
[0.076]
0.092
[0.081]
−0.035
[0.109]
R2 0.974 0.971 0.978 0.983 0.981 0.995
N 55,480 42,103 13,377 5327 4229 1098
***, **, and * denote coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respec-
tively; all regressions have product-year and plant-year ﬁxed effects; and ﬁgures in paren-
theses are standard errors which are clustered by plant-year.of disaggregation, allowing us to test theoretical predictions about
their relative proﬁles. Our ﬁndings show that a two-way distinction is
crucial: between home sales and exports on the one hand, and between
differentiated and non-differentiated products on the other. In the
domestic market, we ﬁnd that both differentiated and non-
differentiated products exhibit quality-based competence, with prices
falling as sales value falls. However, this pattern is signiﬁcantly more
pronounced for differentiated products, exactly as our theory predicts.
The same holds true in the export market, where the difference in
price behavior between the two groups of products is considerably
greater: plants in differentiated-product sectors exhibit quality-based
competence in export markets, but those in non-differentiated-good
sectors exhibit cost-based competence, with core-competence products
selling for signiﬁcantly lower prices on average. These results turn out to
be robust to a slew of alternative ways of grouping our data. We ﬁnd
very similar results whether we consider all products or only those
which are sold in both home and foreign markets; and whether we
consider all plants active in either market or only those active in both.
They also hold when we consider only the sub-sample of single-plant
ﬁrms: conﬁrmation that our theory, which was developed for ﬁrms,
helps in understanding behavior at plant level too. Finally, the patterns
we have found are exhibited by both home-owned and foreign-owned
plants. We can conclude that, for this data set, quality-based compe-
tence is dominant for ﬁrms in differentiated-good sectors, but not for
the export sales of ﬁrms in non-differentiated-good sectors.
Turning to policy, a full consideration of the costs and beneﬁts of
different export-promotion strategies is beyond the scope of this
paper. Nevertheless, our results are suggestive. Export-promotion
policies take a variety of forms, and in the light of our results we can
distinguish between those that focus on cost and those that focus on
quality. The former type of intervention includes measures to stimulate
investment in cost-saving technologies and worker training. The latter
type of intervention includes marketing campaigns to stress theTable 11
Price proﬁles for domestically-owned plants with ﬁve or more products.
Market Home Export
Varieties All Diff. Non-diff. All Diff. Non-diff.
Top product: 0.087***
[0.011]
0.109***
[0.015]
0.025**
[0.012]
−0.032
[0.125]
−0.016
[0.151]
−0.094
[0.128]
Top 2nd: 0.057***
[0.010]
0.079***
[0.014]
0.002
[0.011]
0.011
[0.098]
0.013
[0.128]
−0.031
[0.106]
Top 3rd: 0.053***
[0.010]
0.066***
[0.013]
0.018*
[0.011]
0.076
[0.083]
0.151
[0.100]
−0.142
[0.093]
Top 4th: 0.053***
[0.009]
0.062***
[0.012]
0.027***
[0.010]
−0.02
[0.088]
0.007
[0.108]
−0.106
[0.096]
R2 0.976 0.972 0.978 0.991 0.989 0.995
N 51,850 36,653 15,197 4308 3016 1292
***, **, and * denote coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respec-
tively; all regressions have product-year and plant-year ﬁxed effects; and ﬁgures in paren-
theses are standard errors which are clustered by plant-year.
Table 12
Price proﬁles for foreign-owned plants with ﬁve or more products.
Market Home Export
Varieties All Diff. Non-diff. All Diff. Non-diff.
Top product: 0.142***
[0.044]
0.147***
[0.046]
0.126
[0.081]
0.232**
[0.110]
0.255**
[0.107]
−0.243
[0.347]
Top 2nd: 0.174***
[0.046]
0.180***
[0.048]
0.138
[0.094]
0.293**
[0.129]
0.317**
[0.131]
−0.046
[0.172]
Top 3rd: 0.134***
[0.045]
0.111**
[0.046]
0.305***
[0.115]
0.223**
[0.100]
0.237**
[0.101]
0.022
[0.189]
Top 4th: 0.100*
[0.051]
0.106**
[0.054]
0.063
[0.083]
0.036
[0.120]
0.03
[0.120]
0.008
[0.222]
R2 0.951 0.946 0.986 0.961 0.959 0.993
N 10,448 8514 1934 3048 2489 559
***, **, and * denote coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respec-
tively; all regressions have product-year and plant-year ﬁxed effects; and ﬁgures in paren-
theses are standard errors which are clustered by plant-year.
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certiﬁcations (e.g. ISO 9000 or 14000) to improve the producer's
image. Without further research, it would be premature to suggest
that, in the light of our ﬁndings, export-promotion efforts in middle-
income countries such as Mexico should focus on helping producers to
lower production costs in non-differentiated-good sectors and on
improving perceived product quality in differentiated-good sectors.
Nevertheless, our ﬁndings that Mexican ﬁrms compete in foreign
markets on either cost or quality, depending on whether they operate
in relatively homogeneous or relatively differentiated-good sectors,
suggest that a “one-size-ﬁts-all” policy may not be the most effective
way of promoting exports.
Ourﬁndings also have broader implications for the nature of compe-
tition in international markets. Our data set shows that within-ﬁrm
product heterogeneity is not just a rich-country phenomenon, but is
also important in at least one middle-income country. Moreover, the
evidence we present suggests that only ﬁrms in differentiated-product
sectors compete in exportmarkets on quality. This has a key implication
for understanding how ﬁrms compete successfully abroad.While previ-
ous studies have shown that all exporters have a productivity premium,
our results suggest that those in differentiated-product sectors have a
quality premium too, whereas those producing non-differentiated
goods behave differently at home and away, competing less on quality
and more on price in their export markets.
Appendix A. General functional form for the quality premium
In the text we use a speciﬁc linear form for the relation between the
quality premium ez ið Þ and the two components of quality, the variety-
speciﬁc component of quality z(i), and the quality of the ﬁrm's brand Z.
In this appendix, we show that our results also hold for a more general
functional form of the quality premium.
The quality premium ez ið Þ is now given by the following function ζ:
ez ið Þ ¼ ζ z ið Þ; Z; e ; e ∈ 0;1ð Þ: ð23Þ
We assume that this function ζ has the following properties:
ζ z z ið Þ; Z; e
 
≡ ∂ζ∂z ið Þ N 0; ζZ z ið Þ; Z; e
 
≡ ∂ez ið Þ∂Z N 0; ζ ze z ið Þ; Z; e ≡ ∂2ez ið Þ∂z ið Þ∂e b 0
and ζZe z ið Þ; Z; e
 
≡ ∂
2ez ið Þ
∂Z∂e N 0. Clearly, the perceived quality premium
must be increasing in both components of quality, so that theﬁrst deriv-
atives of ζ with respect to z(i) and Z must be positive. In addition, we
assume that the responsiveness of the quality premium with respect
to the variety-speciﬁc component is decreasing in e while its respon-
siveness with respect to the brand quality is increasing in e. These
additional properties are based on our considerations in the paragraphs
following Eq. (7).Given Eq. (23), theﬁrst order conditions for theﬁrm's optimal choice
of investment in quality are now
ið Þ γk ið Þ0:5 ¼ βζ z z ið Þ; Z; e
 
θx ið Þ; i ∈ 0; δ½  and
iið Þ ΓK0:5 ¼ βζZ z ið Þ; Z; e
 
ΘX
ð24Þ
and the optimal levels of z(i) and Z are given implicitly by
ið Þ z ið Þ ¼ 2θ2 β
γ
ζ z z ið Þ; Z; e
 
x ið Þ; i ∈ 0; δ½  and
iið Þ Z ¼ 2Θ2 β
Γ
ζZ z ið Þ; Z; e
 
X:
ð25Þ
Together with the expression for individual outputs
2eb 1−eð Þx ið Þ ¼ a0 þ βζ z ið Þ; Z; e −c ið Þ−t−2ebeX ð26Þ
and the deﬁnition of ﬁrm output X = ∫0
δ
x(i)di, these four equations
determine simultaneously z ið Þ; Z, x(i), and X.
The price proﬁle p′(i) ≡ ∂p(i)/∂i can be calculated from the price
equation p ið Þ ¼ c ið Þ þ t þ eb 1−eð Þx ið Þ þ ebeX
p0 ið Þ ¼ c0 ið Þ þ eb 1−eð Þx0 ið Þ; ð27Þ
where x′(i) ≡ ∂x(i)/∂i can be calculated from Eqs. (26) and (25)-(i) as
x0 ið Þ ¼− c
0 ið Þ
2eb 1−eð Þ−2ηζ z z ið Þ; Z; e 2 b 0: ð28Þ
As in the main text, η ≡ β
2θ2
γ and η≡
β2Θ2
Γ
 
, and we require thateb 1−eð Þ N ηζ z z ið Þ; Z; e 2 (second order conditions).
Eqs. (27) and (28) yield
p0 ið Þ ¼
eb 1−eð Þ−2ηζ z z ið Þ; Z; e 2
2eb 1−eð Þ−2ηζ z z ið Þ; Z; e 2 c0 ið Þ: ð29Þ
The condition for a negative price proﬁle (“quality-based competence”)
is now
eb
2η
b
ζ z z ið Þ; Z; e
 2
1−eð Þ : ð30Þ
For Corollary 1 (iii) to hold, we now require that the right-hand side of
Eq. (30) is decreasing in e. It is a necessary condition that
ζ ze z ið Þ; Z; e
 
b 0. The necessary and sufﬁcient condition is
2ζ ze z ið Þ; Z; e
  e
ζ z z ið Þ; Z; e
  b − e
1−eð Þ : ð31Þ
The expression on the left hand side of Eq. (31) is the elasticity of
ζz2 with respect to e. On the right hand side we have the elasticity of
∂p(i)/∂x(i) (from Eq. (2)) with respect to e. A decrease in e (products
are more differentiated) has two effects on the price proﬁle. Because
products are weaker substitutes, larger outputs of individual varieties
have a stronger impact on their prices. This tends to accentuate the
negative relation between outputs and prices, and can be measured by
the elasticity ∂p(i)/∂x(i) with respect to e. The second effect comes
from the investment behavior. A decrease in emakes perceived quality
more responsive to variety-speciﬁc quality (ζze b 0), and this boosts
investment in z(i). This effect is more pronounced for larger outputs,
and thus tends to reverse the relation between outputs and prices. It is
this second effect that drives our result of a “quality-based competence”
price proﬁle. Therefore, we require that this quality effect dominate the
35 For simplicity,we abstract from strategic investment byﬁrms. So,we focus only on the
open-loop case where decisions on sales, product scope, and investment are taken
simultaneously.
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condition (31) is always fulﬁlled.
In addition to the slope of the price proﬁle, the functional form ofez ið Þ also matters for the ambiguous result of the impact of an increase in
the market size on scope in Eq. (19). With the more general functional
form used here this equation changes to
dδ
dL
∝ η ζZ z ið Þ; Z; e
 2
e
−η ζ z z ið Þ; Z; e
 2
1−eð Þ : ð32Þ
Here, our result with respect to the degree of product differentiation,
that more varieties are sold in a larger market, the less products are
differentiated, continues to hold if ζ z z ið Þ; Z; e
 2
= 1−eð Þ is decreasing
in e and if ζZ z ið Þ; Z; e
 2
=e is increasing in e. The ﬁrst condition is
discussed above, and the second condition holds if 2ζZe eζZ N1. Again,
the left-hand side is the relative change in the responsiveness of per-
ceived quality (with respect to Z), and the right-hand side is the elastic-
ity of ∂p(i)/∂X with respect to e. The economic intuition is similar. If
goods are less differentiated, the ﬁrm invests more in brand quality,
and this tends to increase demand for marginal products. At the same
time, aggregate output rises, and this tends to depress output of the
marginal variety because of the cannibalization effect. We assume that
the quality effect dominates.
Appendix B. Cournot competition with heterogeneous ﬁrms
The model in the text considered a single monopoly ﬁrm only,
whose goal is to maximize the operating proﬁts from all the products
it sells in a market. Here we show that the results on sales and price
proﬁles derived in the text also hold for a ﬁrm engaged in Cournot
competition that takes as given the outputs of other ﬁrms. We also
derive the comparative statics effects on such a ﬁrm of changes in the
marginal effectiveness of both types of investment, in market size, and
in market access costs.
To simplify notation, we consider a world of two countries only. We
focus on the foreign market, in which we assume there is a ﬁxed
number of ﬁrms, m, of which m are from the home country and m∗
from the foreign country, eachwith the ﬂexiblemanufacturing technol-
ogy considered in the text. We letM,M∗ andM denote the sets of ﬁrms
in the home and foreign countries and in the world, respectively. We
allow for arbitrary differences between ﬁrms in their cost functions,
with the cost function of ﬁrm j denoted by: c j ið Þ; j ¼ 1; :: :; m . The
utility function is unchanged from Eq. (1) in the text, since, in the
absence of investment in quality, consumers do not value differently
the goods produced by different ﬁrms. Hence the demand function is
the same as Eq. (2), except that total consumption is now Y ¼∑ j∈MX j.
Consider the behavior of an individual ﬁrm. The presence of
competitor ﬁrms does not affect the ﬁrst-order condition for the output
of each variety in Eq. (4): each ﬁrm continues to equate the price–cost
margin of each variety to eb times a weighted average of that variety's
output and of its total output. Combining thiswith the demand function,
the expression for outputs, Eq. (5), must be replaced by:
xj ið Þ ¼
aj ið Þ−c j ið Þ−t j−ebeX j−ebeY
2eb 1−eð Þ i ∈ Ω j; j ∈ M ð33Þ
where Ωj = {0,..., δj} is the set of goods sold by ﬁrm j, and, as in the
monopoly case, the sales of each marginal product are zero: xj(δj) = 0.
Note that we write the tariff with ﬁrm subscripts: tj = t for all home
exporting ﬁrms j ∈ M, and tj = 0 for all foreign import-competing
ﬁrms j ∈M∗. As for the ﬁrst-order conditions for investment in quality,they continue to be given by Eq. (9).35 Substituting these into aj(i) and
proceeding as in the text gives, instead of Eq. (12):
xj ið Þ ¼
c j δ j
 
−cj ið Þ
2 eb−η j 1−eð Þh i 1−eð Þ ; i ∈ 0; δ j
h i
; j ∈ M: ð34Þ
This in turn leads to an equation for prices just like Eq. (13) in the text.
Hence Proposition 1 is unaffected: the key condition for the proﬁle of a
ﬁrm's prices to risewith distance from its core competence continues to
be eb N η j 1−eð Þ, independent of the number of ﬁrmsm andm∗.
Consider next the comparative statics of an initial equilibrium.
We seek a set of m equations, one per ﬁrm, which relate changes in
the total output of each ﬁrm, Xj, to changes in exogenous variables χ ¼
η j;η j; L; t
 
. For simplicity we conﬁne attention to the effects of a
change in the relative effectiveness of investment for only one ﬁrm j,
assumed to be an exporter based in the home country. To eliminate
the individual varieties xj(i), integrate Eq. (34) to get:
X j ¼
ϕ j δ j
 
2 eb−η j 1−eð Þh i 1−eð Þ ; ϕ j δ j
 
≡
Z δ j
0
c j δ j
 
−c j ið Þ
h i
di; j ∈ M:
ð35Þ
To obtain a second equation linking Xj and δj, evaluate Eq. (33) at i= δj
to obtain:
c j δ j
 
¼ aj δ j
 
−t j−ebeX j−ebeY
¼ a0j−t j− eb−2η je eX j−ebeY j ∈ M: ð36Þ
Finally, total market sales Y can be eliminated by recalling that it equals
the sales of all m ﬁrms.
To proceed, ﬁrst totally differentiate Eqs. (35) and (36):
dX j ¼
1
2 eb−η j 1−eð Þh i 1−eð Þ δ jc
0
j δ j
 
dδ j þ 2
eb
L
1−eð ÞX jdLþ 2 1−eð Þ2X jdη j
" #
ð37Þ
c0j δ j
 
dδ j ¼−dt j− eb−2η je edX j−ebedY−ebL e X j þ Y dLþ 2e2X jdη j: ð38Þ
Combining these and eliminating δj gives a single equation for eachﬁrm,
which is the total differential of its reaction function in {Xj} space:
A−1j dX j þ ebedY ¼ dχ j ð39Þ
where:
A−1j ≡
1
δ j
2 eb−η j 1−eð Þn o 1−eð Þ þ eb−2η je eδ jh i ð40Þ
and
dχ j ≡−dt j þ
eb
L
2 1−eð ÞX j
δ j
þ e X j þ Y
 " #
dLþ 2
δ j
1−eð Þ2X jdη j þ 2e2X jdη j
ð41Þ
dχj is a composite term summarizing the exogenous shocks to ﬁrm j 's
reaction function. Solving these m reaction functions (Eq. (39)) allows
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variables.
To solve Eq. (39), we follow Dixit (1986). Multiply Eq. (39) by Aj,
sum the reaction functions over all m ﬁrms, and collect terms to solve
for total output Y:
dY ¼
X
j0
Aj0dχ j0
1þ ebeX
j0
Aj0 :
ð42Þ
Next, substitute into Eq. (39) to solve for the change in the output of an
individual ﬁrm:
dX j ¼ Ajdχ j−Ajebe
X
j0
Aj0dχ j0
1þ ebeX
j0
Aj0
¼ Aj
1þ ebeX
j0
Aj0
dχ j þ ebeX
j0
Aj0 dχ j−dχ j0
 24 35:
ð43Þ
Thus any exogenous shock affects the output ofﬁrm jdirectly by shifting
its own reaction function, and also indirectly to the extent that it shifts
differentially the reaction functions of all other ﬁrms. We can now con-
sider the effects of different shocks in turn.
B.1. Effects of tariffs
When the foreign tariff increases, we have: dχj =− dt, j ∈ M and
dχj = 0, j ∈ M∗. Hence from Eq. (43) the effect of a foreign tariff on
the output of a foreign import-competing ﬁrm is:
dX j ¼ Aj
ebeX
j0∈MAj0
1þ ebeX
j0
Aj0
dt N 0; j ∈ M: ð44Þ
This implies that a reduction in foreign trade barriers (dt b 0) lowers the
output of all foreign ﬁrms, since it exposes them to more competition.
Similarly, the change in the total output of a home exporting ﬁrm is:
dX j ¼−Aj
1þ ebeX
j0∈MAj0
1þ ebeX
j0
Aj0
dt b 0; j ∈ M: ð45Þ
Hence a reduction in foreign trade barriers raises the export sales of all
home ﬁrms. From Eq. (35), each ﬁrm's output and scope move together
for given L and η j, and so the effects of a tariff on δj are qualitatively the
same as its effects on the corresponding Xj.
B.2. Effects of the marginal effectiveness of brand-enhancing investment
In this case we have dχ j0 ¼ 2e2X jdη j; j0 ¼ j and dχ j0 ¼ 0; j0≠ j .
Hence from Eq. (43):
dX j ¼ 2e2Aj
1þ ebeX
j0≠ jA j−
1þ ebeX
j0
Aj0−
X jdη jN0: ð46Þ
As for ﬁrm j's scope, it follows immediately from Eq. (35) that it too
must rise. By contrast, both scale and scope of all other ﬁrms must fall.B.3. Effects of the marginal effectiveness of variety-enhancing investment
In this case we have dχ j0 ¼ 2δ j 1−eð Þ
2X jdη j; j
0 ¼ j and dχ j0 ¼ 0; j0≠ j.
Hence from Eq. (43):
dX j ¼ 2 1−eð Þ2
Aj
δ j
1þ ebeX
j0≠ jA j−
1þ ebeX
j0
Aj0−
X jdη jN0: ð47Þ
It also follows immediately that the output of all other ﬁrmsmust fall. As
for the implications for scope, substituting dXj into Eq. (37) yields:
dδ j ¼ 2 eb−η j 1−eð Þn o 1−eð ÞAjδ j
1þ ebeX
j0≠ jA j−
1þ ebeX
j0
Aj0−
−1
24 352 1−eð Þ2X j
δ jc
0
j δ j
  dη j:
ð48Þ
Substituting for A jδ j from Eq. (40), this becomes:
dδ j ¼− 1−
2 eb−η j 1−eð Þn o 1−eð Þ
2 eb−η j 1−eð Þn o 1−eð Þ þ eb−2η je eδ j
1þ ebeX
j0≠ jA j0
1þ ebeX
j0
Aj0
24 352 1−eð Þ2X j
δ jc
0
j δ j
  dη j:
ð49Þ
Both the fractions in parentheses are less than one, so the whole
expression must be negative. Hence product scope must fall for all
ﬁrms in this case. The ﬁrm enjoying more effective investment adopts
a “leaner andmeaner” proﬁle, while all other ﬁrms face tougher compe-
tition and so cut back on both scale and scope.
B.4. Effects of market size
All ﬁrms are directly affected by this shock and the outcome turns
out to depend a lot on the degree of asymmetry between them.
Substituting for dL from Eq. (41) into Eq. (43) gives:
dX j
dlnL
¼
ebAj
1þ ebeΣ j0Aj0 2 1−eð Þ
X j
δ j
þ e X j þ Y
 ( )"
þ ebeΣ j0Aj0 2 1−eð Þ X jδ j −X j0δ j0
 !
þ e X j−X j0
 ( )#
:
ð50Þ
The second set of terms inside the square brackets on the right-hand
side exhibits the “superstar ﬁrms” tendency discussed in the text:
ﬁrmswith total sales Xj or sales per variety
X j
δ j
above the industry average
tend to grow by more, and conversely for ﬁrms below average. In the
special case where goods are homogeneous (e = 1), so ﬁrms are
single-product, Eq. (50) becomes: dX jdlnL ¼
A j
1þebΣ j0A j0
X j þ Y þ ebΣ j0Aj0 X j−X j0 h ieb, with A−1j ¼ eb−2η j. Though simpler than
Eq. (50), this still implies the “superstar ﬁrms” result. A different special
case iswhere allﬁrms are identical, inwhich case the effect on output is:
dlnX
dlnL
¼ 2 1−eð Þ þ mþ 1ð Þeδf g
eb
2 eb−η 1−eð Þn o 1−eð Þ þ mþ 1ð Þeb−2ηen oeδ : ð51Þ
This is greater than one provided either η orη is strictly positive, soﬁrms
engage in either or both type of investment. Finally, when ﬁrms are het-
erogeneous but do not invest, because η j ¼ η j ¼ 0, Eq. (50) reduces to
dlnX j
dlnL ¼ 1.
Turning to the effect on scope, Eq. (38) can be rewritten to give:
dlnδ j
dlnL
¼ 1
E j
dlnX j
dlnL
−
ebeb−η j 1−eð Þ
24 35 ð52Þ
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δ jϕ
0
j δ jð Þ
ϕ j δ jð Þ ¼
δ2j c
0
j δ jð Þ
ϕ j δ jð Þ is the elasticity of cost savings from ﬂexible
manufacturing, as in Eckel and Neary (2010), p. 201. Even for superstar
ﬁrms, scope may fall, and a high effectiveness of investment in individ-
ual varieties, η j, tends to encourage this outcome. When η j ¼ η j ¼ 0, so
ﬁrms do not invest, scope is independent of market size, dlnδ jdlnL ¼ 0, as
noted in Eckel and Neary (2010), Proposition 13. As for the case
where ﬁrms are symmetric, Eq. (52) reduces to:
dlnδ
dlnL
¼
ebeδ
E
2ηe− mþ 1ð Þη 1−eð Þ
2 eb−η 1−eð Þn o 1−eð Þ þ mþ 1ð Þeb−2ηen oeδh i eb−η 1−eð Þn o :
ð53Þ
Clearly, a higher effectiveness of investment in brand quality encour-
ages an expansion of scope, and a higher effectiveness of investment
in the quality of individual varieties encourages a reduction, with
increased competition from more rival ﬁrms tending to accentuate
the latter. With only one ﬁrm, the numerator is proportional to ηe−η
1−eð Þ, the case discussed in the text.
Appendix C. Sales value and distance from core competence
To show that the proﬁle of sales value falls with distance from core
competence, totally differentiate the equation deﬁning s(i):
ds ið Þ
di
¼ p ið Þdx ið Þ
di
þ x ið Þ dp ið Þ
di
ð54Þ
The derivatives of p(i) and x(i) with respect to i can be found by
differentiating Eqs. (13) and (11). Substituting this and p ið Þ ¼ c ið Þ þ t þeb 1−eð Þx ið Þ þ eX½  from the ﬁrst-order condition for output (4) gives:
ds ið Þ
di
¼− c ið Þ þ t þ 2η 1−eð Þ
2x ið Þ þ ebeX
2 eb−η 1−eð Þh i 1−eð Þ dc ið Þdi b 0: ð55Þ
Since c(i) rises with i it follows that sales value must fall with distance
from the ﬁrm's core competence. Finally, dividing dp(i)/di from
Eq. (13) by Eq. (55) we obtain:
dp ið Þ
ds ið Þ ¼−
1−eð Þ eb−2η 1−eð Þh i
c ið Þ þ t þ 2η 1−eð Þ2x ið Þ þ ebeX : ð56Þ
This equation shows that prices are related to sales value according to
the sign of the term eb−2η 1−eð Þ.
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